Research shows that in the data privacy domain, the regulation promoted by frontrunner states in federated systems such as the United States or the European Union generates races to the top, not to the bottom. Institutional dynamics or the willingness of major interstate companies to work with a single standard generally create opportunities for the federal lawmaker to level up privacy protection.
Introduction
One of the defining values of federalism is "the framework it creates for… ongoing negotiation of disagreements large and small". 1 In making space for conflicts to unravel on the (sub)-state level, be that after a centralized solution has been adopted or before one has emerged, federalism provides both institutionalized spaces for points of entry in the two federated systems contribute to the continuous development of two models of regulating commercial privacy that remain thus far distinct.
The article proceeds as follows: in Part I, I briefly discuss the "trading up" logic and its limits; Part II recaptures the legacy of the defunct Safe Harbor agreement 8 stricter standards developed in jurisdictions with a large market share, which forces private companies in other jurisdictions with weaker standards either to meet the higher standard or to sacrifice a large portion of their exports. There are two key components to this argument. 14 The first is that rules move to a higher level. The second is that this process is driven by export-oriented firms that do not want to have different rules in their home market (since different rules drive up production costs vis-à-vis domestic competitors).
"Trading up" in domestic settings
The "trading up" logic, primarily economic, can be reinforced by additional legal considerations and in the case of data privacy, has some explanatory value in domestic settings. In a federation like the U.S., for the sake of consistency and uniformity in the treatment of consumers, but also in order to avoid legal challenges in potential cross-border lawsuits, some major US interstate businesses prefer to voluntarily adopt the higher state standard 15 of data privacy. Such willingness on the part of interstate companies to comply with the higher standard has led to the fast uptake of breach notification rules in the U.S. When a breach of personal information affects residents of US states that do not have a "harm threshold" (establishing that no notification is needed unless there is certain harm for the consumer) as well as residents of states with lower or no such "harm threshold", most businesses provide notice to all affected individuals even though they might not be legally obliged to do so. 16 In the U.S., the willingness of major interstate companies to work with a single standard generally creates opportunities for the federal lawmaker to step in and level up (sector) privacy protections at a cost that is less than what is generally assumed. Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce were soon interpreted as a fallback option because of the FTC's limited resources and wide-ranging responsibilities in other areas of consumer protection.
Thus, instead of being entrusted to an independent data protection authority as postulated by the EU Directive, data privacy under the Safe Harbor scheme was to be enforced mainly through private dispute-resolution mechanisms. Finally, although the EU DPAs were encouraged to communicate violations to the FTC, the US companies that joined the scheme were thought generally immune from the enforcement remit of the EU Member States' protection authorities. and 2008. 43 The first study came a year after the framework was established and found that only 41 US companies had enrolled and that these demonstrated "an abysmal level of implementation". Safe Harbor did not set any vetting mechanism around who can self-certify. Moreover, companies did not post their privacy policies online (in implementation of the Notice principle) and many of those that did, used corporate privacy policies that were opaque, ambiguous, and often difficult to locate, or they also diluted the substance of the principles; others were still certified after their membership had lapsed. The later studies similarly identified serious gaps in implementation, and found the dispute settlement procedures wanting. In 2010 the Düsseldorfer Kreis, the group of German state data protection authorities, voiced its 39 Under Section 5 of the FTC Act banks, savings and loan institutions, as well as federal credit unions and air carriers are excluded from FTC jurisdiction, see U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 40 That principle postulates that data cannot be further processed in ways incompatible with the original purposes for collection. 41 "Participants must allow individuals to choose whether their personal information will be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than that for which it was collected.", supra note 8. 42 DPAs were able to suspend a particular transfer under a narrow set of circumstances, concerns and issued a decision requiring German exporters of data to the US through the Safe Harbor framework to actively check that companies in the US importing data actually comply with the Safe Harbor Principles. To sum up, assessed from an EU law standpoint, the Safe Harbor compromise has far from managed to harmonize the US approach to data privacy with that of the EU.
Reinforcing the FTC-model
Although it is difficult to disentangle the causal mechanisms of internal from that of external factors, from a US perspective, the Safe Harbor arrangement has contributed to the development and reinforcement of a properly American, marketdriven model of data privacy that allows for policing of privacy violations at the fringes. I will call this the FTC-model after the name of the Federal Trade
Commission, which has gradually become the primary enforcement mechanism for commercial privacy in the US. 44 On the one hand, there is no "omnibus" or comprehensive federal statute that protects data privacy in the U.S. and adoption of such is nowhere in sight. 45 On the other hand, in the US constitutional protections remain very constrained. 46 The most significant features of the FTC-model are therefore the framing of privacy as a consumer protection and not as a fundamental rights issue, as well as the preponderance of an agency-based rather than judicial enforcement. Thus, the majority of FTC enforcement actions end in settlements and consent decrees 47 with dubious deterrent power. 48 breach notifications share an affinity with the EU model of data privacy in that they are mandatory in most states and required by statute; further, a data privacy regulator oversees them and can sometimes impose fines and sanctions. However, the insufficient deterrent effect of the rather symbolic fines imposed by both the FTC and the Attorneys General 69 perpetuates the lack of a market for privacy that could render meaningful choice to the consumer. This approach differs from the EU aspirations of policing data privacy violations through more robust fines, as recently espoused in the GDPR: after 2018, both DPAs and the national courts in the EU will be able to set in place "a system which provides for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties" 70 that can amount to up to 4% of the annual worldwide turnover for undertakings.
III. The Schrems judgment of the Court of Justice
Even if the Safe Harbor arrangement can be seen as a catalyst for the development of some data privacy protections where none existed before, and as a boost to the US FTC-model, it has justifiably attracted many critics in both the US and the EU over the years. From a European law perspective, it had multiple deficiencies connected with its inability to overcome the problems associated with self-regulatory schemes. However, it was not before the Snowden revelations that the arrangement finally became the subject of reforms in the EU. 71 Even though Snowden exposed that the sharing of data held by private companies for national security purposes under the PRISM program was a blatant violation of Safe Harbor, the renegotiations of the agreement were protracted and still ongoing when the CJEU invalidated the Decision of the Commission authorizing data transfers to the US. 81 For a pragmatic interpretation, see also Christopher Kuner, "Indeed, many or perhaps even most countries around the world exempt the activities of their intelligence services from their national data protection law and lack an effective oversight structure for surveillance activities, leading one to ask how under the Court's reasoning adequate protection for data transfers can ever exist.", The Sinking of the Safe Harbor at http://verfassungsblog.de/the-sinking-of-the-safe-harbor-2/ (2015).
and private uses of data under EU law it was about both. The decision therefore reaffirmed the EU aspirations for data privacy. Especially after the entry into force of a binding EU Charter with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU model places an emphasis on privacy and data protection as fundamental rights that can be limited only with sufficient safeguards; 82 individual redress is central to this approach; and while the independent investigatory powers of the DPAs 83 (strengthened as they are by the possibility of imposing substantial fines to companies), 84 remain an indispensable feature of the EU model, judicial enforcement is at the apex of this approach. 85 The main criticism of this approach is that it might not realistically be sustainable in the age of digitalization and Big Data.
Plugs to the EU-model: the role of Californian and German initiatives
To be sure, market-oriented instruments have complimented the constitutionalization of the EU data privacy model too. Some EU Member States followed the lead of California and introduced breach notification requirements at the national level. For example, in Germany, the 2009 amendments to the Federal Act of Data Protection established a requirement on data breach notification. 86 Under the amendments, data controllers must notify data subjects and DPAs of any unauthorized access or unlawful transfer of personal data, if the incident "threatens significant harm" to the rights and protected interests of the data subjects. Since the act does not specifically define "significant harm," it has been interpreted to give companies a certain leeway in determining whether an unauthorized or unlawful activity meets the threshold. 87 In Spain, a royal decree of 2007 postulated that data controllers, as part of Id. If harm is detected, notice must be given immediately after the data is secured. Also, the notification requirements only extend to some categories of data such as bank or credit card their security policies, should draw up a document containing notification procedures, as well as management and response to incidents related to breaches of personal information. 88 Although at first not enshrined in legislation but through a Code of Practice, Ireland also required that data controllers inform the Irish DPA of breaches that the national regulator could then decide whether to disclose to the data subjects.
89
Ultimately, with the General Data Protection Regulation, 90 the EU took up the insights of Californian law. In the latest version of the Regulation's preamble, a broad definition of damage caused by data breaches is described as a trigger for these provisions. 91 The data controller is supposed to notify the particular data breach to the competent supervisory authority (usually, the DPA) without undue delay and whenever feasible, within 72 hours of the breach unless the controller is able to demonstrate that the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of the individual. 92 The first version of the Regulation put forward in the Commission's proposal suggested a 24-hour period of notification, which was, however, deemed unnecessarily strict and burdensome in the version espoused by the European Parliament (EP). The risk-based approach, clearly prominent in the latest version of the Regulation, requires immediate notification only in the case of potential high risk for the data subject. 93 The standard of "undue delay" is established by taking into account "in particular the nature and gravity of the personal data breach and its consequences and adverse effects for the data subject". 94 Although inspired by US information, "sensitive information," or information that is subject to professional or official confidentiality. Finally, although bulk collection for national security and law enforcement purposes is not terminated in the US, under the Privacy Shield the US government has committed to minimize it whenever possible, as well as to introduce the institute of an ombudsman to deal with complaints under this header. 116 Again, under the supplemental principles of the Privacy Shield, the focus is on disclosure: individuals should be informed of the possibility that access to their personal information can be requested by the US public authorities.
V. Concluding Remarks
In a fully-fledged federation like the U.S., or in a federating entity like the EU, and even when transferred to the international legal order, federal structure is the perennial battleground for change in a political or a legal status quo. Federalism illustrates the existence of different points of entry for foreign and international norms and laws. As noted by Judith Resnik, a national movement can create dynamics for the ratification of an international treaty by first seeking to enlist the support of state officials in a federation; even if ratification fails, states and localities can also directly 114 Supra note 9, paras. 64-65. Individual complaints can also come to the DPAs as test cases designed by data privacy activists that can also try to challenge the agreement in direct actions for annulment before the EU General Court. 115 Supra note 11, Section 6. 121 Safe Harbor (and one could add, the Privacy Shield) was designed, in fact, to limit trading up effects by allowing companies to use different models in different markets and blunt the extaterritorial effects of EU law. More generally, on the extraterritoriality of EU law, 
